Phenomenology

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I’ve continued to struggle with the problem of methodology. This is part of the research proposal work that I need to do. I’m digging into different methodologies to find the best fit. While I initially committed to digital ethnography, I continue to explore methodologies to confirm that I’ve made the correct choice, or to find the best fit. I’m pulling on threads to look at all the options, ensuring that the method and methodology relate to philosophical underpinnings. Unambiguous purpose, structure and findings will result (Lopez & Willis, 2004).

What I’m looking at today is phenomenology since I had looked at this initially, and dismissed as not applicable. But while reading Ihde & Malfouris, with reference to ‘post phenomenolgy’, I knew I needed to go back and revisit this methodology. I am still trying to tease apart how this is uniquely different than phenomenography [Phenomenography, Oct 21, 2018]. So here are some thoughts.

Cilesiz (2011) suggests phenomenology as a means for examining the experiences people have with educational technology. He defines experience as “(1) the apprehension of an object, a thought, or an emotion through the senses or mind; (2) active participation in events or activities, leading to the accumulation of knowledge or skill” (p. 489). So in terms of open educational practices (OEPr), the experiences include not only the thoughts, emotions and participation, it also references the objects and accumulated knowledge. That makes sense, if I want to explore the experiences that teacher educators have in their OEPr in terms of media and digital literacies.

Valentine et al. (2018) describe phenomenology as a “qualitative research methodology concerned with investigating phenomena as they manifest through lived-experiences. The unit of analysis resides in the intentional meanings of phenomena. Analysis of those intentionalities” (p. 462). The emphasis is mine – intention being the key term. It is the awareness of the experience that is being ‘measured’ or recorded, and this is always partial and framed by my lens or ‘attention’, for both the researcher and the participant.

Valentine et al. (2018) continue by describing some shifts and the evolution of this methodology “phenomenologists have viewed intentionality as something that is: described (transcendental phenomenology), interpreted (hermeneutic phenomenology), or resists centering and embraces contexts, situations, and the partial (post-intentional phenomenology) (Vagle 2014, 2018)” (p. 462). This distinction is helpful since this helps me situate Ihde & Malfouris (2019) in the field of phenomenologists.

Further to this, phenomenologists examine “”ways in which we find ourselves being in relation to the world through our day-to-day living” (Vagle, 2014, p. 20). According to Valentine et al., (2018) this means not only the experiences we may have within human interactions alone but also with our relationship to other things e.g. digital technologies.

This “interconnectedness between people, things, and the world they live in is what phenomenologists call intentionality. In phenomenology, intentionality is where meaning resides—it is at the heart of any phenomenological investigation” (p. 462) Likewise, the distinction of the role the researcher plays in the phenomenon is in question. While described/ transcendental phenomenology suggests the researcher is removed from the phenomenon, both “interpreted and post-intentional phenomenology suggest that researcher and phenomenon are inextricably linked, and that this relationship is invaluable to understanding the phenomenon itself (Dahlberg et al. 2008; Vagle 2014, 2018).” (Valentine et al., 2018, p. 463). With this statement, I can see where IPA falls into the phenomenological continuum.

“Husserl (1901/1970a), who is considered by most to be the founder of phenomenology as a philosophy, saw science belonging to the lifeworld rather than something to be abstracted and construed as more precise” (Valentine et. al., 2018, p. 463).

Valentine et al., (2018) continue with this statement:

“According to van Manen (1990), “phenomenology attempts to explicate the meanings as we live them in our everyday existence, our lifeworld” (p. 11). Meanings are not independent entities, but rather connections that emerge in relations, contexts, and across time. In phenomenology, these connections are described as intentionalities.” The phrase “intentionality” refers to the ways in which phenomena are lived in this emergent sense.” (Valentine et al., 2018, p. 463). This “intentionality in phenomenology describes an active relationship, as Dahlberg et al. (2008) indicated, “in which we experience the things and events of our world as endowed with meaning, as meant” (p. 49)” (Valentine, et. al., p. 463).

Valentine et al., present a more detailed analysis of these THREE approaches to phenomenological research (chart page 465):

  • descriptive: “Cilesiz’s approach typifies descriptive methods in that she identified the essence of a phenomenon by prioritizing the invariant aspects of the participants’ descriptions (i.e., consciousness) of their experience”. (Valentine et. al., 2018, p. 464).
  • interpretive: “The shift to hermeneutics is largely attributed to Heidegger (1927/2008), who was once a student of Husserl. Questioning Husserl’s epistemological focus on intentionality as knowing (i.e., consciousness of) something, Heidegger took up phenomenology as an ontological project, investigating what it means to be in the world.” (Valentine et al., 2018, p. 464). Further to this “philosophical shift from knowing to being changes the nature of intentionally, moving away from consciousness of a phenomenon towards revealing “how things manifest and matter in the world” (same reference). Continuing into this, Valentine et al, suggest “phenomenologists like Merleau-Ponty (1945/2002) and van Manen (2014), mind and body are not separate entities: we know the world bodily and through our embodied actions…body and consciousness are dialogically related (van Manen 2014, pp. 128–129).
  • post (intentional, structural)-phenomenology shifts the focus from ‘being’ to ‘becoming’ suggesting that phenomenon are constantly changing (as is the case with OEPr) and that our understanding of the phenomenon can only be partial; the focus is on ‘becoming’ within a socially constructed context; temporality and partiality are salient features of the phenomenon (I’m thinking this ‘turn’ shifts phenomenology closer toward phenomenography.) What is important for researching into OEPr, is that multiplicity and variation of the phenomenon are examined at any given moment, but also over moments of time.

References

Ihde, D., & Malafouris, L. (2019). Homo faber Revisited: Postphenomenology and Material Engagement Theory. Philosophy & Technology, 32(2), 195–214. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-018-0321-7

Lopez, K. A., & Willis, D. G. (n.d.). Descriptive Versus Interpretive Phenomenology: Their Contributions to Nursing Knowledge. Qualitative Health Research,14(5), 726–735. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732304263638

Valentine, K. D., Kopcha, T. J., & Vagle, M. D. (2018). Phenomenological Methodologies in the Field of Educational Communications and Technology. TechTrends, 62(5), 462–472. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11528-018-0317-2